tion
of similar powerlessness in presence of Pompeius, and had been saved
from destruction only by his--pusillanimous, it is true, rather than
magnanimous--retirement; it is probable that Caesar hesitated
to breakthe heart of his beloved daughter who was sincerely attached
to her husband--in his soul there was room for much besides the statesman.
But the decisive reason was doubtless the consideration of Gaul.
Caesar--differing from his biographers--regarded the subjugation
of Gaul not as an incidental enterprise useful to him
for the gaining of the crown, but as one on which depended
the external security and the internal reorganization, in a word
the future, of his country. That he might be enabled to complete
this conquest undisturbed and might not be obliged to take in hand
just at once the extrication of Italian affairs, he unhesitatingly
gave up his superiority over his rivals and granted to Pompeius
sufficient power to settle matters with the senate and its adherents.
This was a grave political blunder, if Caesar had no other object
than to become as quickly as possible king of Rome; but the ambition
of that rare man was not confined to the vulgar aim of a crown.
He had the boldness to prosecute side by side, and to complete,
two labours equally vast--the arranging of the internal affairs
of Italy, and the acquisition and securing of a new and fresh soil
for Italian civilization. These tasks of course interfered
with each other; his Gallic conquests hindered much more than helped
him on his way to the throne. It was fraught to him with bitter fruit
that, instead of settling the Italian revolution in 698,
he postponed it to 706. But as a statesman as well as a general
Caesar was a peculiarly daring player, who, confiding in himself
and despising his opponents, gave them always great
and sometimes extravagant odds.

The Aristocracy Submits

It was now therefore the turn of the aristocracy to make good
their high gage, and to wage war as boldly as they had boldly
declared it. But there is no more pitiable spectacle
than when cowardly men have the misfortune to take a bold resolution.
They had simply exercised no foresight at all. It seemed to have
occurred to nobody that Caesar would possibly stand on his defence,
or that Pompeius and Crassus would combine with him afresh
and more closely than ever. This seems incredible; but it becomes
intelligible, when we glance at the persons who then led
the consti