his additional
limitation, that the Legislature of a State shall pass no act 'impairing
the obligation of contracts.'" In short, as in Fletcher vs. Peck, what
was originally a moral obligation is regarded as having been lifted
by the Constitution into the full status of a legal one, and this
time without any assistance from "the general principles of our free
institutions."

How is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dartmouth
College vs. Woodward to be assessed today? Logically the basis of it was
repudiated by the Court itself within a decade, albeit the rule it lays
down remained unaffected. Historically it is equally without basis, for
the intention of the obligation of contracts clause, as the evidence
amply shows, was to protect private executory contracts, and especially
contracts of debt. * In actual practice, on the other hand, the decision
produced one considerable benefit: in the words of a contemporary
critic, it put private institutions of learning and charity out of the
reach of "legislative despotism and party violence."

* Much of the evidence is readily traceable through the Index to
Max Farrand's "Records of the Federal Convention."

But doubtless, the critic will urge, by the same sign this decision also
put profit-seeking corporations beyond wholesome legislative control.
But is this a fact? To begin with, such a criticism is clearly
misdirected. As we have just seen, the New Hampshire Superior Court
itself would have felt that Fletcher vs. Peck left it no option but to
declare the amending act void, had Dartmouth College been, say, a gas
company; and this was in all probability the universal view of bench
and bar in 1819. Whatever blame there is should therefore be awarded the
earlier decision. But, in the second place, there does not appear
after all to be so great measure of blame to be awarded. The opinion
in Dartmouth College vs. Woodward leaves it perfectly clear that
legislatures may reserve the right to alter or repeal at will the
charters they grant. If therefore alterations and repeals have not been
as frequent as public policy has demanded, whose fault is it?

Perhaps, however, it will be argued that the real mischief of the
decision has consisted in its effect upon the state Legislatures
themselves, the idea being that large business interests, when offered
the opportunity of obtaining irrepealable charters, have frequently
found it worth their while to assail frail