nse that it deals
with practice, but that it influences practice? This was its
original purpose. 'It is the function of ethics,' says Aristotle,
'to act, not only to theorize.'"

Paulsen refers to the fact that Schopenhauer takes a different view:

"All philosophy," he says, "is theoretical. Upon mature reflection
it ought finally to abandon the old demand that it become
practical, guide action, and transform character, for here it is
not dead concepts that decide, but the innermost essence of the
human being, the demon that guides him. It is as impossible to
teach virtue as it is to teach genius. It would be as foolish to
expect our moral systems to produce virtuous characters and saints
as to expect the science of aesthetics to bring forth poets,
sculptors and musicians." To this view Paulsen replies:

"I do not believe that ethics need be so faint-hearted. Its first
object, it is true, is to understand human strivings and modes of
conduct, conditions and institutions, as well as their effects upon
individual and social life. But if knowledge is capable of
influencing conduct--which Schopenhauer himself would not deny--it
is hard to understand why the knowledge of ethics alone should be
fruitless in this respect.... Moral instruction, however, can have
no practical effect unless there be some agreement concerning the
nature of the final goal--not a mere verbal agreement, to be sure,
but one based upon actual feeling.... It will be the business of
ethics to invite the doubter and the inquirer to assist in the
common effort to discover fixed principles which shall help the
judgment to understand the aims and problems of life."

What is here said concerning the usefulness of an investigation of fixed
ethical principles has application to a consideration of what rules of
conduct should prevail in the legal profession. The high social purpose
of the profession, its beneficial function, and the limitations upon its
action that should be self-enforced in order to make the calling an
advantage and not a detriment to the public weal, should be understood.
Indeed, the profession of the law, if it serves its high purpose, and
vindicates its existence, requires a double allegiance from those who
have assumed its obligations, first, a duty toward their clients, and
second, a duty toward the court. And tho