to the distrust
occasioned by the rebellion; in part to the use of partisan channels
of information; but under all this was a deeper cause--inability to
conceive of such a relation as exists between Great Britain and Canada
to-day. In that respect Peel and his colleagues resembled most of the
public men of their time. They could understand separation; they could
understand a relation in which the British government and its agents
ruled the colonies in a kindly and paternal fashion; but a union under
which the colonies were nations in all but foreign relations passed
their comprehension. When the colonies asked for complete
self-government it was supposed that separation was really desired.
Some were for letting them go in peace. Others were for holding them
by political and commercial bonds. Of the latter class, Stanley,
colonial secretary under Peel, was a good type. He believed in
"strong" governors; he believed in a system of preferential trade
between Great Britain and the colonies, and his language might have
been used, with scarcely any modification, by the Chamberlain party in
the recent elections in Great Britain. When, in 1843, he introduced
the measure giving a preference to Canadian wheat, he expressed the
hope that it would restore content and prosperity to Canada; and when
that preference disappeared with the Corn Laws, he declared that the
basis of colonial union was destroyed.
From the union to September, 1842, no French-Canadian name appears in
a Canadian government. French-Canadians were deeply dissatisfied with
the terms of the union; there was a strong reluctance to admitting
them to any share of power, and they complained bitterly that they
were politically ostracized by Sydenham, the first governor. His
successor, Bagot, adopted the opposite policy, and earned the severe
censure of the government at home.
On August 23rd, 1842, Sir Robert Peel wrote to Lord Stanley in terms
which indicated a belief that Governor Bagot was experiencing great
difficulty in carrying on the government. He spoke of a danger of
French-Canadians and Radicals, or French-Canadians and Conservatives,
combining to place the government in a minority. He suggested various
means of meeting the danger, and said, "I would not voluntarily throw
myself into the hands of the French party through fear of being in a
minority."
Before instructions founded on this letter could reach the colony, the
governor had acted, "throwing him
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