housand to sixteen thousand strong,
was scattered over the country, or warred only with Indians on the
frontier. But all the great and highly perfected military powers on
the continent of Europe consider such a commander a wholly
unnecessary luxury, and not even Austria indulges in it now.

During the campaign against Napoleon in 1813-14 the allies were
commanded by a generalissimo, the Prince Schwartzenberg; but he
moved with the army, actively directed that great campaign.

The Continental sovereigns of Europe are born Commanders-in-chief of
their respective land and naval forces. As such, each of them has a
personal staff; but such a personal staff must not be confused with
a general, central staff, the paramount necessity of which for any
military organization is similar to the nervous system and the brain
for the human body. Special extensive studies as well as practical
familiarity with the use of the drill and the tactics of infantry,
cavalry and artillery, constitute absolutely essential requirements
for an officer of such a staff. The necessary military special
information also, as well as the duties, are very varied and
complicated (see "_Logistics_" by Jomini and others.) This country
has no such school of staff. West Point neither instructs nor
provides the Army with officers for staff duties; and of course the
difficulty now to obtain efficient officers for a staff, if not
insurmountable, is appalling, and is only to be mastered by a great
deal of good will, by insight and by discernment.

Many months ago, I pointed out, in the press, this paramount
deficiency in the organization of the Federal Army. The Prince de
Joinville ascribes General McClellan's military failures to the
paramount inefficiency of that General's staff. Any one in the least
familiar with military organization and military science is
thunderstruck to find how the Federal military organization deal
with staffs, and what is their comprehension of the qualification
for staff duties.

It deserves a mention that engineers and engineering constitute what
is rather a secondary element in the organization of a special or of
a general central staff.

Plans of wide comprehensive campaigns are generally elaborated by
such general staffs. In the campaigns of 1813-14, the sovereigns of
Russia and Prussia were surrounded by their respective general, and
not only personal staffs. With the Colonels Dybitsch and Toll, of
the Russian general staff,