h does not require the co-operation of the Senate, and
which, without any constitutional amendment, really deprives the
legislature of the power to select United States Senators as the
electoral college has been deprived of all power in the choice of
President.

The second defect in the Senate is the equal representation of the
states in that body. It is not only absurd but manifestly unjust that a
small state like Nevada should have as much representation in the
controlling branch of Congress as New York with more than one hundred
and seventy-one times as much population. A more inequitable
distribution of representation it would be difficult to imagine; yet
this evil could not be removed even by constitutional amendment, since
this matter does not come within the scope of the amending power, unless
the state or states affected by such proposed change should all give
their assent.

The third defect in the Senate is the extraordinary power which the
Constitution has conferred upon it. If it were a directly elected body
whose members were apportioned among the states according to population,
the overshadowing influence of the Senate would not be a serious
matter. But, as shown in Chapter VI, that body controls jointly with the
President the appointing and the treaty-making power. Moreover, the
latter power may be exercised with reference to many things concerning
which Congress has or could legislate. The Senate and the President may
thus repeal what Congress has enacted. We thus have the peculiar
situation that a law enacted with the concurrence of the House may be
repealed without its consent, while a law which takes the form of a
treaty can not be repealed without the consent of the Senate.

Theoretically, the Constitution could be amended so as to diminish the
power of the Senate, but as a matter of fact no change in the
Constitution would be more difficult to bring about. Any proposal to
reduce the power of the Senate would jeopardize the prestige and
influence of the smaller states no less than the proposal to deprive
them of equal representation in that body. The small states approach
political equality with the large, just in proportion as the influence
of the Senate is a dominating factor in the policy of the government.
Any attack on this equality of representation would ally the small
states together in defense of this privilege, and make it impossible to
obtain the assent of three-fourths of the states to