did not, on retiring the
night of the 5th, anticipate a general attack on the next morning.
They took, doubtless, the usual precautions against the ordinary
surprise of pickets, grand-guards, and outposts, but they made no
preparation for a general battle, the more necessary as three of
the five divisions had never been under fire, and most of them had
little, if any, drill in manoeuvres or loading and firing, and few
of the officers had hitherto heard the thunder of an angry cannon-
shot or the whistle of a dangerous bullet. But it may be said the
private soldiers of the Confederate Army were likewise inexperienced
and illy disciplined. In a large sense this was true, though many
more of the Confederate regiments had been longer subjected to
drill and discipline than of the Union regiments, and they had
great confidence in their corps and division commanders, many of
whom had gained considerable celebrity in the Mexican and Indian
Wars.

The corps organization of the Confederate Army, in addition to the
division, gave more general officers and greater compactness in
the handling of a large army. At this time corps were unknown in
the Union Army. And of still higher importance was the fact that
one army came out prepared and expecting battle, with all its
officers thoroughly instructed in advance as to what was expected,
and the other, without such preparation, expectancy, or instruction,
found itself suddenly involved against superior numbers in what
proved to be the greatest battle thus far fought on the American
continent. The Confederate hosts in the early morning moved to
battle along their entire front with the purpose of turning either
flank of the imperfectly connected Union divisions, but their
efforts were, in no substantial sense, successful. The reckless
and impetuous assaults, however, drove back, at first precipitately,
then more slowly, the advance Union divisions, though at no time
without fearful losses to the Confederates. These heavy losses
made it necessary soon to draw on the Confederate reserves. The
Union commanders took advantage of the undulations of the ground,
and the timber, to protect their men, often posting a line in the
woods on the edge of fields to the front, thus compelling their
foes to advance over open ground exposed to a deadly fire. The
early superiority of the attacking army wore gradually away, and
while it continued to gain ground its dead and wounded were numerous