fastening forever
the institution of slavery on the inhabitants of this vast empire.
There are those yet living who deny that, even under the present
Constitution of the United States or the constitutions of the States
since erected therein, slavery is _lawfully_ excluded therefrom.

This article reads:

"The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in
the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible,
according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the
enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens
of the United States; and in the meantime they shall be maintained
and protected in the enjoyment of their liberty, _property_, and
the religion they profess."

Justice Catron, of the United States Supreme Court, speaking in
the Dred Scott case, for the majority of the court and of this
article, says:

"Louisiana was a province where slavery was not only lawful, but
where property in slaves was the most valuable of all personal
property. The province was ceded as a _unit_, with an equal right
pertaining to all its inhabitants, in every part thereof, to own
slaves."

He and others of the concurring justices held that the inhabitants
at the time of the purchase, also all immigrants after the cession,
were protected in the right to hold slaves in the entire purchase.

Near the close of his opinion, still speaking of this article and
the acquired territory, he says:

"The right of the United States in or over it depends on the contract
of cession, which operates to incorporate as well the Territory as
its inhabitants into the Union.

"My opinion is that the third article of the treaty of 1803, ceding
Louisiana to the United States, stands protected by the Constitution,
and cannot be repealed by Congress."

This view was heroically combatted by a minority of the court,
especially by Justices McLean and Curtis. The latter, in his
opinion, said

"That a treaty with a foreign nation cannot deprive Congress of
any part of its legislative power conferred by the people, so that
it no longer can legislate as it is empowered by the Constitution."

Also, that if the treaty expressly prohibited (as it did not) the
exclusion of slavery from the ceded territory the "court could not
declare that an act of Congress excluding it was void by force of
the treaty. . . . A refusal to execute such a stipulation would
not be a judicial, but a political and legislative