iring line.

426. In deploying the division each brigade is assigned a definite
task or objective. On receipt of his orders, the brigade commander
conducts his brigade in column or in line of regiments until it is
advisable that it be broken into smaller columns. He then issues his
order, assigning to each regiment its task, if practicable. In a
similar manner the regimental commanders lead their regiments forward
in column, or in line of columns, until the time arrives for issuing
the regimental order. It is seldom advisable to break up the battalion
before issuing orders for its deployment.

427. Each subordinate commander, after receiving his order for the
action, should precede his command as far as possible, in order to
reconnoiter the ground personally, and should prepare to issue his
orders promptly.

428. Each commander of a column directs the necessary reconnaissance
to front and flank; by this means and by a judicious choice of ground
he guards against surprise.

429. The premature formation of the firing line causes unnecessary
fatigue and loss of time, and may result in a faulty direction being
taken. Troops once deployed make even minor changes of direction with
difficulty, and this difficulty increases with the length of the
firing line.

430. In the larger units, when the original deployment is found to be
in the wrong direction, it will usually be necessary to deploy the
reserve on the correct front and withdraw and assemble the first line.

431. To gain decisive results, it will generally be necessary to use
all the troops at some stage of the combat. But in the beginning,
while the situation is uncertain, care should be taken not to engage
too large a proportion of the command. On the other hand, there is no
greater error than to employ too few and to sacrifice them by
driblets.

432. When it is intended to fight to a decision, fire superiority is
essential. To gain this, two things are necessary: A heavy fire and a
fire well directed and controlled. Both of these are best obtained
when the firing line is as dense as practicable, while leaving the men
room for the free use of their rifles.

If the men are too widely separated, direction and control are very
difficult, often impossible, and the intensity of fire is slight in
proportion to the front occupied.

433. In an attack or stubborn defense the firing line should have a
density of one man per yard of front occupied.

Where the tactic