, it was, if
not proof positive, strong circumstantial evidence that the pie was of
a most inferior order of succulence; and Mr. Murch was a fairly good
judge, being himself chairman of the finance committee of the United
States Pie Company. He was a director in two banks, three trust
companies, several railroads, at least four mining companies of the
immensely profitable kind whose stock is never offered to the general
public, besides innumerable industrial and general commercial concerns
of every sort, color, and description, the sole similarity between them
being their translucent money-making attributes. He was, on the other
hand, a trustee of an art museum which was liberally assisted by
contributors other than Mr. Murch, whose assistance was administrative
rather than pecuniary; and he was on the executive committee of a
charity organization society which under his astute management bade
fair to be more than self-supporting, and there was really no valid
reason to the contrary, for it transacted a very considerable business
in sawed and split wood which it sold at current prices after paying
each of its unfortunate employees twenty-two cents and an indescribably
bad dinner for eight hours' hard work in the wood yard. Mr. Murch was
also interested in a chain of blue-front restaurants, and a line of
South American freighters, and last but not least, he was the heaviest
stockholder and most potent factor in the management of the Salamander
Fire Insurance Company.
The Salamander was as exactly the antithesis of the Guardian as it was
possible to conceive. Where the Guardian was conservative, the
Salamander was ultra-radical; where the Guardian wrote a million and
three quarters yearly in premiums, the Salamander, though its surplus
was rather less than that of the other company, wrote nearly two
millions and a half. In short the Salamander gambled, and played to
win, and as a matter of fact it usually did win by sheer audacity. It
had never made any money out of its underwriting, that real test of
company efficiency; but four years out of five the daring manipulation
of its assets in Wall Street--politely termed the slight rearrangement
of some of its investments--yielded it a handsome profit. Its dividend
rate was more than twice that of the Guardian, and in some years, when
losses were heavy, it failed to earn its dividend and was obliged to
take the money for its payment out of its already narrow surplus.
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