ge, as in the second way;
or by affection, as in the third way.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument avails for the third mode, but not for
the first two.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the actions of another do not proceed from
habits that are in me, yet they either produce in me something that
gives pleasure; or they make me appreciate or know a habit of mind;
or they proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by love.
________________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 6]

Whether Doing Good to Another Is a Cause of Pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that doing good to another is not a cause
of pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by one's obtaining one's
proper good, as stated above (AA. 1, 5; Q. 31, A. 1). But doing good
pertains not to the obtaining but to the spending of one's proper
good. Therefore it seems to be the cause of sadness rather than of
pleasure.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that
"illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality." Now it is
a mark of prodigality to do good to others; while it is a mark of
illiberality to desist from doing good. Since therefore everyone
takes pleasure in a connatural operation, as stated in _Ethic._ vii,
14 and x, 4, it seems that doing good to others is not a cause of
pleasure.

Obj. 3: Further, contrary effects proceed from contrary causes. But
man takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds of ill-doing, such as
overcoming, contradicting or scolding others, or, if he be angry, in
punishing them, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore
doing good to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "it is
most pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and
strangers."

_I answer that,_ Doing good to another may give pleasure in three
ways. First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good
conferred on another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being
united to others by love, we look upon their good as being our own,
we take pleasure in the good we do to others, especially to our
friends, as in our own good. Secondly, in consideration of the end;
as when a man, from doing good to another, hopes to get some good for
himself, either from God or from man: for hope is a cause of
pleasure. Thirdly, in consideration of the principle: and thus, doing
good to another, can give pleasure in respect of a threefold
principle. One is the faculty o