and deputies had fraternized with Italians and Frenchmen and her
diplomatists had been in frequent and friendly communication with
those of France, Britain and Russia. Even statesmen had allowed
themselves to be persuaded by words and gestures which it now appears
were meant only to be conditional assurances or social lubricants. The
Serbian Premier, for instance, whose shrewdness is proverbial,
exclaimed to an Italian journalist, in the second half of June:
"Roumania cannot but follow the example set her by Italy. Indeed, you
may telegraph to your journal that Roumania's entry into the arena is
a question of days and it may be only of hours. Of this many
foretokens have come to our knowledge."[100] But the optimists who had
drawn practical conclusions from Roumanian promises and friendships
lost sight of the difference between their own mentality and that of
the Balkan peoples. They also failed to make due allowance for the
influence of German interpenetration, the power of German gold, and
the deterrent effect of German victories. And above all, they left out
of consideration the really decisive question of military prospects as
conditioned by strategical position and supplies of munitions.
[100] _Giornale d'Italia_, June 19, 1915. _Corriere della
Sera_, June 20, 1915.
The party of intervention, however, was still active and full of
ardour. Its chief, Take Jonescu, is not merely Roumania's only
statesman, but has established a claim to rank as one of the prominent
public men of the present generation. Unluckily he has long been out
of office, and his party is condemned to the Cassandra role of
uttering true prophecies which find no credence among those who wield
the power of putting them to good account. M. Bratiano's appropriate
attitude may be described as statuesque. Occasionally his Press organs
commented upon the manifestations of the interventionists in words
barbed with bitter sarcasm and utilitarian maxims. "Roumania's blood
and money," the _Independence Roumaine_ explained, "must be spent only
in the furtherance of Roumania's interest." Her cause must be
dissociated from that of the belligerents. To this Take Jonescu
replied[101] that it is precisely for the good of Roumania that her
interest should not be separated from that of the Entente Powers in
the conflict. For on the issue of this conflict depends the
state-system of Europe and also the future of Roumania. If the Germans
are triumphant, h
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