ure of State
regulation believed themselves to be justified by the eternal verities
of economic law, and this claim even the advocates of the measure
seldom ventured to dispute. They took refuge rather in a conception of
economic law as a dangerous monster, whose claws must be clipped in
the interests of the higher good. This notion that all interference
with so-called "free competition," is a violation (though very likely
fully justified) of economic laws has sunk deep into our common
thought. So that to this day, whenever we see at work the hand of a
State department, a trust or a trade union, we are apt to say "Demand
and supply are here in abeyance," and possibly we add "A good thing
too." Since in the matter of wages, the hand of the trade union is
very generally evident, it is impossible to discuss the subject-matter
of this chapter, until we have rid our minds of this quite baseless
prepossession. To sweep away this cobweb, I urge the reader to recall
here the general tenor of the analysis of the preceding
chapters. Whether we were dealing with the price of an ordinary
commodity, with joint products, land or capital, we came across
relationships which seemed altogether more fundamental than our
present industrial system; nor, we may incidentally observe, were we
ever required to suppose that the present system was one of "perfect
competition." These relationships were almost invariably such that
even a world socialist commonwealth would find it necessary to
maintain them. It was not suggested, and most certainly it must not be
thought, that a world socialist commonwealth, or even a more modest
remodeling of the social order would not effect great changes,
possibly for good, and possibly for ill. The same economic laws might
be made to bear very different fruits, but they themselves would
remain unchanged. What is true in all these other fields--this should
be our predisposition--is not likely to be quite untrue in the field
of labor.

Sec.2. _Ideas and Institutions_. Another point is worth noting here. We
are sometimes advised to distinguish sharply between "What should be"
and "What is"; often two very different things. The advice is
pertinent and useful, particularly in the sphere of sociology. But
our incorrigible habit of confusing the two things together is not
without justification, or at least excuse. For, in fact, they
gravitate towards one another with a force which is just as strong as
the capacity