vinced that education, more than nature, is
the cause of that great difference which you see in the characters of
men. While you were a child, I endeavored to form your heart habitually
to virtue and honor, before your understanding was capable of showing you
their beauty and utility. Those principles, which you then got, like your
grammar rules, only by rote, are now, I am persuaded, fixed and confirmed
by reason. And indeed they are so plain and clear, that they require but
a very moderate degree of understanding, either to comprehend or practice
them. Lord Shaftesbury says, very prettily, that he would be virtuous for
his own sake, though nobody were to know it; as he would be clean for his
own sake, though nobody were to see him. I have therefore, since you have
had the use of your reason, never written to you upon those subjects:
they speak best for themselves; and I should now just as soon think of
warning you gravely not to fall into the dirt or the fire, as into
dishonor or vice. This view of mine, I consider as fully attained. My
next object was sound and useful learning. My own care first, Mr. Harte's
afterward, and OF LATE (I will own it to your praise) your own
application, have more than answered my expectations in that particular;
and, I have reason to believe, will answer even my wishes. All that
remains for me then to wish, to recommend, to inculcate, to order, and to
insist upon, is good-breeding; without which, all your other
qualifications will be lame, unadorned, and to a certain degree
unavailing. And here I fear, and have too much reason to believe, that
you are greatly deficient. The remainder of this letter, therefore, shall
be (and it will not be the last by a great many) upon that subject.

A friend of yours and mine has very justly defined good-breeding to be,
THE RESULT OF MUCH GOOD SENSE, SOME GOOD NATURE, AND A LITTLE SELF-DENIAL
FOR THE SAKE OF OTHERS, AND WITH A VIEW TO OBTAIN THE SAME INDULGENCE
FROM THEM. Taking this for granted (as I think it cannot be disputed), it
is astonishing to me that anybody who has good sense and good nature (and
I believe you have both), can essentially fail in good-breeding. As to
the modes of it, indeed, they vary according to persons, and places, and
circumstances; and are only to be acquired by observation and experience:
but the substance of it is everywhere and eternally the same. Good
manners are, to particular societies, what good morals are to society