a doubt
that the adoption of those broad principles of right and wrong which
underlie the entire structure of modern civilization was due to
scientific induction,--in other words, to the belief, based on
observation and experience, that the principles implied were essential
to communal progress. He who has scanned the pageant of history knows
how often these principles seem to be absent in the intercourse of men
and nations. Yet the ideal is always there as a standard by which all
deeds are judged.

It would appear, then, that the entire superstructure of later science
had its foundation in the knowledge and practice of prehistoric man. The
civilization of the historical period could not have advanced as it has
had there not been countless generations of culture back of it. The new
principles of science could not have been evolved had there not
been great basal principles which ages of unconscious experiment had
impressed upon the mind of our race. Due meed of praise must be given,
then, to our primitive ancestor for his scientific accomplishments; but
justice demands that we should look a little farther and consider the
reverse side of the picture. We have had to do, thus far, chiefly
with the positive side of accomplishment. We have pointed out what our
primitive ancestor knew, intimating, perhaps, the limitations of his
knowledge; but we have had little to say of one all-important feature
of his scientific theorizing. The feature in question is based on the
highly scientific desire and propensity to find explanations for the
phenomena of nature. Without such desire no progress could be made. It
is, as we have seen, the generalizing from experience that constitutes
real scientific progress; and yet, just as most other good things can
be overdone, this scientific propensity may be carried to a disastrous
excess.

Primeval man did not escape this danger. He observed, he reasoned,
he found explanations; but he did not always discriminate as to the
logicality of his reasonings. He failed to recognize the limitations of
his knowledge. The observed uniformity in the sequence of certain events
impressed on his mind the idea of cause and effect. Proximate causes
known, he sought remoter causes; childlike, his inquiring mind was
always asking, Why? and, childlike, he demanded an explicit answer. If
the forces of nature seemed to combat him, if wind and rain opposed his
progress and thunder and lightning seemed to menace hi