another eye, and at that in the eye
which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there
see itself?
ALCIBIADES: That is evident.
SOCRATES: But looking at anything else either in man or in the world,
and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself?
ALCIBIADES: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye,
and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye
resides?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself,
must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul
in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this?
ALCIBIADES: I agree, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that
which has to do with wisdom and knowledge?
ALCIBIADES: There is none.
SOCRATES: Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine;
and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will
be most likely to know himself?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly.
SOCRATES: And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever
know our own good and evil?
ALCIBIADES: How can we, Socrates?
SOCRATES: You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would
be no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was
really his?
ALCIBIADES: It would be quite impossible.
SOCRATES: Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything
belonged, if we did not know ourselves?
ALCIBIADES: How could we?
SOCRATES: And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we
know the belongings of our belongings?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly not.
SOCRATES: Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now
that a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay,
rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the
discernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the
things of self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and of
the same art.
ALCIBIADES: So much may be supposed.
SOCRATES: And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will
in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others?
ALCIBIADES: Very true.
SOCRATES: And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know
the affairs of states?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
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