anything
like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present
themselves which would insure great success. General Meade was left in
command of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly intrenched; and
was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and
himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an
effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. There was
no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no
more reinforcements were sent to the valley.

I informed Sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcements
being sent from Richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had
made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to
the valley was still at Richmond, because we had captured six or seven
hundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades having
contributed to our list of captures. I also informed him that but one
division had gone, and it was possible that I should be able to prevent
the going of any more.

To add to my embarrassment at this time Sherman, who was now near
Atlanta, wanted reinforcements. He was perfectly willing to take the
raw troops then being raised in the North-west, saying that he could
teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would
learn in a week in a camp of instruction. I therefore asked that all
troops in camps of instruction in the North-west be sent to him.
Sherman also wanted to be assured that no Eastern troops were moving out
against him. I informed him of what I had done and assured him that I
would hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, and
that up to that time none had gone. I also informed him that his real
danger was from Kirby Smith, who commanded the trans-Mississippi
Department. If Smith should escape Steele, and get across the
Mississippi River, he might move against him. I had, therefore, asked
to have an expedition ready to move from New Orleans against Mobile in
case Kirby Smith should get across. This would have a tendency to draw
him to the defence of that place, instead of going against Sherman.

Right in the midst of all these embarrassments Halleck informed me that
there was an organized scheme on foot in the North to resist the draft,
and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from the
field to put it down. He also advised taking in sail, and not going