maxim "not to fight two
decisive battles at the same time." If true, the maxim was not
applicable in this case. It would be bad to be defeated in two decisive
battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. I,
however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn
from Rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory
were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was
over, when these troops could be returned. Rosecrans was ordered to
move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege.
Finally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days afterwards
Vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg were free to
return.
It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief the
movement against Mobile. I knew the peril the Army of the Cumberland
was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but
also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line
over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly
being strengthened. Mobile was important to the enemy, and in the
absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than
artillery. If threatened by land and from the water at the same time
the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its
defence. Those troops would necessarily come from Bragg. My judgment
was overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over
other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the
most service.
Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in trouble and
required assistance. The emergency was now too immediate to allow us to
give this assistance by making an attack in rear of Bragg upon Mobile.
It was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sent
from every available point.
Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg south of the Tennessee
River, and through and beyond Chattanooga. If he had stopped and
intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right and
the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated. But he pushed
on, with his forces very much scattered, until Bragg's troops from
Mississippi began to join him. Then Bragg took the initiative.
Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army
together at Chickamauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, before
the main battle was brought on. T
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