ct as possible. Whether an individual
will, or will not, believe in religious miracles depends ultimately
upon the view of the world which grows up in his mind. And this mental
outlook is a function of his training and his psychological make-up.
The theological miracle is more deductive than inductive. I mean that
it is a consequence of a dogma {134} rather than an independently given
fact. The religious outlook comes first in order and dominates the
fact. Just the opposite is the case in science. There the fact comes
first and the theory afterwards. As I have written in my _Logic_:
"Mere speculation uncontrolled by fact is almost certain to lose touch
with reality. It may lead to the construction of beautiful systems,
but these systems, for all their splendor and subtlety, are sure to
lack value as means of interpreting the world in which we actually
live." But is not the theological miracle an instance of just such
uncontrolled speculation? An omnipotent God could do anything to, or
in, his footstool. Of course he could. You are only developing the
implications of your hypothesis. The test questions are, first, Is it
his nature to want to do these abrupt things? second, Is this
conception of an omnipotent God the most satisfactory hypothesis? Does
it help us to meet the facts and events of human life? We know how the
idea arose, and we know that it was based on interpretations of nature
that seem to us now essentially illusory. The rub of the matter is,
that it is of no assistance to science and creates hosts of artificial
difficulties. We have been discussing one of these artificial problems
in the present chapter and shall be engaged in the discussion of others
in the next two chapters. A naturalistic metaphysics and ethics is far
easier to formulate than a theological system free from contradiction.
But suppose that certain marvels which would not fit into the natural
course of things were established. How could it be shown that these
peculiar events were the acts of a supernatural agent? Strictly
speaking, only revelation could accomplish this feat. But revelation
{135} is, itself, a miracle which needs accrediting. And so you are,
once more, in a vicious circle. Revelation might be a well-accredited
mode of proof if it had an organ of a public character--a voice from
heaven, for instance. But such a voice would become a part of nature
for us; in other words, its assumption implies anothe
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