r own ambition, their avarice, their vengeance and fury.
There is no question that the Freethinker has motives to be good, even
though he admit not notions that bridle his passions. It is true that
the Freethinker has no invisible motives, but he has motives, and a
visible restraint, which, if he reflects, cannot fail to regulate his
actions. If he doubts about religion, he does not question the laws of
moral obligation; nor that it is his duty to moderate his passions, to
labor for his happiness and that of others, to avoid hatred, disdain,
and discord as crimes; and that he should shun vices which may injure
his constitution, reputation, and fortune. Thus, relatively to his
morality, the Freethinker has principles more sure than those of
superstition and fanaticism. In fine, if nothing can restrain the
Freethinker, a thousand forces united would not prevent the fanatic
from the commission of crimes, and the violation of duties the most
sacred.
Besides, I believe that I have already proved that the morality of
superstition has no certain principles; that it varies with the
interests of the priests, who explain the intentions of the Divinity,
as they find these accordant or discordant to their views and
interests; which, alas! are too often the result of cruel and wicked
purposes. On the contrary, the Freethinker, who has no morality but
what he draws from the nature and character of man, and the constant
events which transpire in society, has a certain morality that is not
founded either on the caprice of circumstances or the prejudices of
mankind; a morality that tells him when he does evil, and blames him
for the evil so done, and that is superior to the morality of the
intolerant fanatic and persecutor.
You thus perceive, Madam, on which side the morality of the
Freethinkers leans, what advantages it possesses over that inculcated
on the superstitious devotee, who knows no other rule than the caprice
of his priest, nor any other morality than what suits the interest of
the clergy, nor any other virtues than such as make him the slave of
their will, and which are too often in opposition to the great
interests of mankind. Thus you perceive, that what is understood by
the natural morality of the Freethinker, is much more constant and
more sure than that of the superstitious, who believe they can render
themselves agreeable to God by the intercession of priests. If the
Freethinker is blind or corrupted, by not kno
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