convinced, that
the sum of his happiness is more increased by the feelings of
benevolence, than it could be by the gratification of avarice; but,
though his understanding may perceive the demonstration of this moral
theorem, though it is the remote principle of his whole conduct, it
does not occur to his memory in the form of a prudential aphorism,
whenever he is going to do a generous action. It is essential to our
ideas of generosity, that no such reasoning should, at that moment,
pass in his mind; we know that the feelings of generosity are
associated with a number of enthusiastic ideas; we can sympathize with
the virtuous insanity of the man who forgets himself whilst he thinks
of others; we do not so readily sympathize with the cold strength of
mind of the person, who, deliberately preferring _the greatest
possible share of happiness_, is benevolent by rule and measure.

Whether we are just or not, in refusing our sympathy to the man of
reason, and in giving our spontaneous approbation to the man of
enthusiasm, we shall not here examine. But the reasonable man, who has
been convinced of this propensity in human nature, will take it into
his calculations; he will perceive, that he loses, in losing the
pleasure of sympathy, part of the sum total of his possible happiness;
he will consequently wish, that he could add this item of pleasure to
the credit side of his account. This, however, he cannot accomplish,
because, though he can by reason correct his calculations, it is not
in the power, even of the most potent reason, suddenly to break
habitual associations; much less is it in the power of cool reason to
conjure up warm enthusiasm. Yet in this case, enthusiasm _is the thing
required_.

What the man of reason cannot do for himself after his associations
are strongly formed, might have been easily accomplished in his early
education. He might have been taught the same general principles, but
with different habits. By early associating the pleasures of sympathy,
and praise, and affection with all generous and benevolent actions,
his parents might have joined these ideas so forcibly in his mind,
that the one set of ideas should never recur without the other.
Whenever the words benevolence or generosity were pronounced, the
feelings of habitual pleasure would recur; and he would, independently
of reason, desire from association to be generous. When enthusiasm is
fairly justified by reason, we have nothing to fear fr