was utterly unfit for war with any
first-class nation. Mr. Meyer was interrupted many times by applause,
and the loudest outburst came when he placed the blame for what he
termed the present demoralized state of the navy squarely up to
Secretary Josephus Daniels. He said, in part:_

In calling attention to these defects I have not done so from a desire
to criticise the present head of the navy, although I do believe that
he is responsible for the demoralized condition of the personnel and
the decreased efficiency of the navy.

_In advancing his argument for a greater navy Mr. Meyer contended that
such a step would be the best safeguard against war. He asserted that
we would have had no war with Spain in 1908 if we had had four more
ships like the Oregon. With such a powerful fighting force, he argued,
no nation at that time would have dared to meet us. Spain would have
yielded without a fight, and this country would have saved
$500,000,000. He continued:_

The only attack we need consider is an attack from some great naval
power, and for that reason we need an adequate navy because it tends
toward peace, because it discourages attack and serves the best
interests of the country, while an inadequate navy is a vast expense
to the country and does not serve as a protection.

Of the thirty-five battleships that we have today only twenty-one are
in commission and ready for emergency. Of those twenty-one, three have
broken shafts, and the fourth is a turbine battleship which was put
out of commission because it needs to be thoroughly overhauled. In
addition to that, there are seventy fighting vessels which are not
ready to be called upon for an emergency because they are out of
commission and would require a long overhauling. We lack battle
cruisers, scout cruisers, aeroplanes, and armed airships.

Our submarine fleet is in a critical condition. The complement of
torpedo vessels has been reduced from 15 to 25 per cent. to get men to
commission new boats. This reduction in personnel is a serious
handicap, reduces the efficiency of the destroyers, affects
contentment, and prevents the boats being kept in good condition. The
Atlantic fleet needs 5,000 men, according to the evidence of the
Commander in Chief of that fleet. The reserve fleet at Philadelphia
was largely depleted in order to get a new crew for the Alabama when
she was ordered to Hampton Roads to enforce neutrality; and the naval
force of Hampton Roads was a pi