cial order."

"Law certainly begins in influence," said Reding, "for it presupposes a
lawgiver; afterwards it supersedes influence; from that time the
exertion of influence is a sign of party."

"Too broadly said, as you yourself just now allowed," said Carlton: "you
should say that law _begins_ to supersede influence, and that _in
proportion_ as it supersedes it, does the exertion of influence involve
party action. For instance, has not the Crown an immense personal
influence? we talk of the Court _party_; yet it does not interfere with
law, it is intended to conciliate the people to the law."

"But it is recognized by law and constitution," said Charles, "as was
the Dictatorship."

"Well, then, take the influence of the clergy," answered Carlton; "we
make much of that influence as a principle supplemental to the law, and
as a support to the law, yet not created or defined by the law. The law
does not recognize what some one calls truly a 'resident gentleman' in
every parish. Influence, then, instead of law is not necessarily the
action of party."

"So again, national character is an influence distinct from the law,"
said Sheffield, "according to the line, '_Quid leges sine moribus_?'"

"Law," said Carlton, "is but gradually formed and extended. Well, then,
so far as there is no law, there is the reign of influence; there is
party without of necessity _party_ action. This is the justification of
Whigs and Tories at the present day; to supply, as Aristotle says on
another subject, the defects of the law. Charles I. exerted a regal,
Walpole a ministerial influence; but influence, not law, was the
operating principle in both cases. The object or the means might be
wrong, but the process could not be called party action."

"You would justify, then," said Charles, "the associations or
confraternities which existed, for instance, in Athens; not, that is, if
they 'took the law into their own hands,' as the phrase goes, but if
there was no law to take, or if there was no constituted authority to
take it of right. It was a recurrence to the precedent of Deioces."

"Manzoni gives a striking instance of this in the beginning of his
_Promessi Sposi_," said Sheffield, "when he describes that protection,
which law ought to give to the weak, as being in the sixteenth century
sought and found almost exclusively in factions or companies. I don't
recollect particulars, but he describes the clergy as busy in extending
their immu