as garrisons for posts
to which the militia might resort for protection or supplies.
Experience had proved that the sudden desultory attacks of the
frontier militia and rangers were productive of more valuable
consequences, than the methodical operations of a regular force. But,
should it even be conceded that invasion and conquest were to be
contemplated, the existing establishment, if completed, would be
sufficiently great; and it was still insisted that, even for the
purposes of conquest, the frontier militia were superior to any
regulars whatever.

The expense of such an army as the bill contemplated was said to be an
object worthy of serious attention; and members were requested to
observe the progress of this business, and to say where it would stop.
At first, only a single regiment had been raised, and the expense was
about one hundred thousand dollars; a second was afterwards added,
which swelled the expense to three hundred thousand; and now a
standing force of five thousand one hundred and sixty-eight men is
contemplated, at an annual expense of above a million and a quarter.
They were preparing to squander away money by millions; and no one,
except those who were in the secrets of the cabinet, knew why the war
had been thus carried on for three years.

Against the motion for striking out, it was urged that the justice of
the war could not be questioned by any man who would allow that self
preservation, and indispensable necessity, could furnish sufficient
motives for taking up arms. It was proved by unquestionable documents,
that from the year 1783 to 1790, there had been not less than fifteen
hundred persons, either the inhabitants of Kentucky, or emigrants on
their way to that country, who had been massacred by the savages, or
dragged into captivity; and there was reason to believe that on the
frontiers of Virginia, and of Pennsylvania, the murdered and the
prisoners would furnish a list almost equally numerous.

The conciliatory disposition of the government was stated, and its
repeated efforts to obtain a peace were enumerated. It was
particularly observed that in 1790, when a treaty was proposed at the
Miamis villages, the Indians at first refused to treat;--they next
required thirty days to deliberate;--this request was acceded to; and,
in the interim, offensive operations were expressly prohibited by the
President. Yet, notwithstanding this forbearance on the part of the
whites, not less than one h