t sometimes, in doing things one is bound to do. And
when one does one's duty, or (speaking of God) when, after full
consideration, one does that which reason demands, one is not responsible
for events, even when one foresees them. One does not will these evils; but
one is willing to permit them for a greater good, which one cannot in
reason help preferring to other considerations. This is a _consequent_
will, resulting from acts of _antecedent_ will, in which one wills the
good. I know that some persons, in speaking of the antecedent and
consequent will of God, have meant by the antecedent that which wills that
all men be saved, and by the consequent that which wills, in consequence of
persistent sin, that there be some damned, damnation being a result of sin.
But these are only examples of a more general notion, and one may say with
the same reason, that God wills by his antecedent will that men sin not,
and that by his consequent or final and decretory will (which is always
followed by its effect) he wills to permit that they sin, this permission
being a result of superior reasons. One has indeed justification for
saying, in general, that the antecedent will of God tends towards the
production of good and the prevention of evil, each taken in itself, and as
it were detached (_particulariter et secundum quid_: Thom., I, qu. 19, art.
6) according to the measure of the degree of each good or of each evil.
Likewise one may say that the consequent, or final and total, divine will
tends towards the production of as many goods as can be put together, whose
combination thereby becomes determined, and involves also the permission of
some evils and the exclusion of some goods, as the best possible plan of
the universe demands. Arminius, in his _Antiperkinsus,_ explained very well
that the will of God can be called consequent not only in relation to the
action of the creature considered beforehand in the divine understanding,
but also in relation to other anterior acts of divine will. But it is
enough to consider the passage cited from Thomas Aquinas, and that from
Scotus (I, dist. 46, qu. 11), to see that they make this distinction as I
have made it here. Nevertheless if anyone will not suffer this use of the
terms, let him put 'previous' in place of 'antecedent' will, and 'final' or
'decretory' in place of 'consequent' will. For I do not wish to wrangle
about words.