predetermination. For one must have either the one or the other. Thomas
Aquinas is a writer who is accustomed to reason on sound principles, and
the subtle Scotus, seeking to contradict him, often obscures matters
instead of throwing light upon them. The Thomists as a general rule follow
their master, and do not admit that the soul makes its resolve without the
existence of some predetermination which contributes thereto. But the
predetermination of the new Thomists is not perhaps exactly that which one
needs. Durand de Saint-Pourcain, who often enough formed a party of his
own, and who opposed the idea of the special co-operation of God, was
nevertheless in favour of a certain predetermination. He believed that God
saw in the state of the soul, and of its surroundings, the reason for his
determinations.

331. The ancient Stoics were in that almost of the same opinion as the
Thomists. They were at the same time in favour of determination and against
necessity, although they have been accused of attaching necessity to
everything. Cicero says in his book _De Fato_ that Democritus, Heraclitus,
Empedocles and Aristotle believed that fate implied necessity; that others
were opposed to that (he means perhaps Epicurus and the Academicians); and
that Chrysippus sought a middle course. I think that Cicero is mistaken as
regards Aristotle, who fully recognized contingency and freedom, and went
even too far, saying (inadvertently, as I think) that propositions on
contingent futurities had no determinate truth; on which point he was
justifiably abandoned by most of the Schoolmen. Even Cleanthes, the teacher
of Chrysippus, although he upheld the determinate truth of future events,
denied their necessity. Had the Schoolmen, so fully convinced of this [325]
determination of contingent futurities (as were for instance the Fathers of
Coimbra, authors of a famous Course of Philosophy), seen the connexion
between things in the form wherein the System of General Harmony proclaims
it, they would have judged that one cannot admit preliminary certainty, or
determination of futurition, without admitting a predetermination of the
thing in its causes and in its reasons.

332. Cicero has endeavoured to expound for us the middle course taken by
Chrysippus; but Justus Lipsius observed, in his _Stoic Philosophy_, that
the passage from Cicero was mutilated, and that Aulus Gellius has preserved
for us the whole argument of the Stoic philosopher (_Noc