ese reasons
be not applicable to God, they make it clear, nevertheless, that an action
like that of this prince may appear preposterous when it is detached from
the circumstances indicating its cause. All the more must one deem that God
has acted well, and that we should see this if we fully knew of all that he
has done.

162. M. Descartes, in a letter to the Princess Elizabeth (vol. 1, letter
10) has made use of another comparison to reconcile human freedom with the
omnipotence of God. 'He imagines a monarch who has forbidden duels, and
who, knowing for certain that two noblemen, if they meet, will fight, takes
sure steps to bring about their meeting. They meet indeed, they fight:
their disobedience of the law is an effect of their free will, they are
punishable. What a king can do in such a case (he adds) concerning some
free actions of his subjects, God, who has infinite foreknowledge and
power, certainly does concerning all those of men. Before he sent us into
this world he knew exactly what all the tendencies of our will would be: he
has endued us therewith, he also has disposed all other things that are
outside us, to cause such and such objects to present themselves to our
senses at such and such a time. He knew that as a result of this our free
will would determine us toward some particular thing, and he has willed it
thus; but he has not for that willed to constrain our free will thereto. In
this king one may distinguish two different degrees of will, the one
whereby he willed that these noblemen should fight, since he brought about
their meeting, and the other whereby he did not will it, since he forbade
duels. Even so theologians distinguish in God an absolute and independent
will, whereby he wills that all things be done just as they are done, [225]
and another which is relative, and which concerns the merit or demerit of
men, whereby he wills that his Laws be obeyed' (Descartes, letter 10 of
vol. 1, pp. 51, 52. Compare with that the quotation made by M. Arnauld,
vol. 2, p. 288 _et seqq_. of his _Reflexions on the System of Malebranche_,
from Thomas Aquinas, on the antecedent and consequent will of God).

163. Here is M. Bayle's reply to that (_Reply to the Questions of a
Provincial_, ch. 154, p. 943): 'This great philosopher is much mistaken, it
seems to me. There would not be in this monarch any degree of will, either
small or great, that these two noblemen should obey the law, and not fight.
He would will