s opinion. If the objection were
completely evident, it would triumph, and the thesis would be overthrown.
But when the objection is only founded on appearances or on instances of
the most frequent occurrence, and when he who makes it desires to draw from
it a universal and certain conclusion, he who upholds the Mystery may
answer with the instance of a bare possibility. For such an instance [119]
suffices to show that what one wished to infer from the premisses, is
neither certain nor general; and it suffices for him who upholds the
Mystery to maintain that it is possible, without having to maintain that it
is probable. For, as I have often said, it is agreed that the Mysteries are
against appearances. He who upholds the Mystery need not even adduce such
an instance; and should he adduce it, it were indeed a work of
supererogation, or else an instrument of greater confusion to the
adversary.

80. There are passages of M. Bayle in the posthumous reply that he made to
M. Jacquelot which seem to me still worthy of scrutiny. 'M. Bayle'
(according to pp. 36, 37) 'constantly asserts in his _Dictionary_, whenever
the subject allows, that our reason is more capable of refuting and
destroying than of proving and building; that there is scarcely any
philosophical or theological matter in respect of which it does not create
great difficulties. Thus', he says, 'if one desired to follow it in a
disputatious spirit, as far as it can go, one would often be reduced to a
state of troublesome perplexity; and in fine, there are doctrines certainly
true, which it disputes with insoluble objections.' I think that what is
said here in reproach of reason is to its advantage. When it overthrows
some thesis, it builds up the opposing thesis. And when it seems to be
overthrowing the two opposing theses at the same time, it is then that it
promises us something profound, provided that we follow it _as far as it
can go_, not in a disputatious spirit but with an ardent desire to search
out and discover the truth, which will always be recompensed with a great
measure of success.

81. M. Bayle continues: 'that one must then ridicule these objections,
recognizing the narrow bounds of the human mind.' And I think, on the other
hand, that one must recognize the signs of the force of the human mind,
which causes it to penetrate into the heart of things. These are new
openings and, as it were, rays of the dawn which promises us a greater
light: I mean