Europe in the middle ages; and repudiating the
exercise of liberty of conscience against the "_hommes competents_", of
whom, by the assumption, the new priesthood would be composed. Was Mr.
Congreve as forgetful of this, as he seems to have been of some other
parts of the "Philosophie Positive," when he wrote, that "in any
limited, careful use of the term, no candid man could say that the
Positive Philosophy contained a great deal as thoroughly antagonistic to
[the very essence of[28]] science as Catholicism"?

M. Comte, it will have been observed, desires to retain the whole of
Catholic organization; and the logical practical result of this part of
his doctrine would be the establishment of something corresponding with
that eminently Catholic, but admittedly anti-scientific,
institution--the Holy Office.

I hope I have said enough to show that I wrote the few lines I devoted
to M. Comte and his philosophy, neither unguardedly, nor ignorantly,
still less maliciously. I shall be sorry if what I have now added, in my
own justification, should lead any to suppose that I think M. Comte's
works worthless; or that I do not heartily respect, and sympathise with,
those who have been impelled by him to think deeply upon social
problems, and to strive nobly for social regeneration. It is the virtue
of that impulse, I believe, which will save the name and fame of Auguste
Comte from oblivion. As for his philosophy, I part with it by quoting
his own words, reported to me by a quondam Comtist, now an eminent
member of the Institute of France, M. Charles Robin:--

"La Philosophie est une tentative incessante de l'esprit humain
pour arriver au repos: mais elle se trouve incessamment aussi
derangee par les progres continus de la science. De la vient pour
le philosophe l'obligation de refaire chaque soir la synthese de
ses conceptions; et un jour viendra ou l'homme raisonnable ne fera
plus d'autre priere du soir."

FOOTNOTES:

[13] I am glad to observe that Mr. Congreve, in the criticism with which
he has favoured me in the number of the _Fortnightly Review_ for April
1869, does not venture to challenge the justice of the claim I make for
Hume. He merely suggests that I have been wanting in candour in not
mentioning Comte's high opinion of Hume. After mature reflection I am
unable to discern my fault. If I had suggested that Comte had borrowed
from Hume without acknowledgment; or if, instead of trying t