, but subject to the same human caprices, and a time
will come when the benefits he bestowed upon the French nation will be
appreciated more than they are this day.

In 1812, Europe was in a state of dammed convulsion. The wars, though
always successful for France, had brought about no definite settlement
of international affairs. Peace was transitory, and the dread of
Napoleon's power and genius was the only check on rapacious designs on
his dominion.

What direct or indirect share Marie Louise had in bringing about the
war with Russia and then the great European struggle will never be
wholly known, but as the wife of Napoleon she would have opportunities
of hearing from himself and those who were in his confidence remarks
and even discussions on the complexities of the political situation.
She was in daily communication with Metternich, and constantly
corresponding with her father; and even allowing that her intentions
were loyal at that time to her husband and to the country of her
adoption, she may have unconsciously conveyed something that in the
hands of adroit diplomats would reveal the pivot on which great issues
might depend. Then, placing the Regency in her hands was an unchecked
temptation, and must be counted as one of Napoleon's great mistakes.
Imbued with an abundant share of Austrian predilection, and occupying
a mechanical or fictitious position towards France and its ruler, and
in view of her subsequent conduct, it is a reasonable assumption that
during the Regency she conveyed important information of military
movements and intentions to the Austrian Court, which it was not slow
to take advantage of; and if truth were told, it would be found that
the Allies owed much of their success to the Austrian Archduchess. May
it not have been part of the subtle policy of Austria in arranging the
marriage? Everything certainly points to it.

Instead of making Metternich a present at the Prague Congress of a
snuff-box which cost 30,000 francs, as a token of friendship, Fouche,
who always had his mind well stored with ideas of corruption,
suggested to the Emperor that, if it was intended to buy Austria off,
he ought to make it millions. If Napoleon had been a man after his own
heart, this might have been a successful solution for a time, but
only for a time. Meneval says that the Emperor, who had a horror of
corruption, replied to him with a gesture of disgust.

In the early part of 1812, when war with Russia h