had no expectation of procuring any
additional reinforcements.

At this time, Gonzalo Pizarro was very anxious to devise some stratagem
for inveigling the viceroy into his hands, as he considered his
usurpation unsafe so long as that officer remained alive and at the head
of a military force. With this view, that the viceroy might return into
Peru where he might have it in his power to bring him to action, Gonzalo
gave out that he intended to proceed to Las Charcas at the southern
extremity of Peru, to repress the disorders occasioned by Centeno,
leaving Captain Pedro de Puelles at Quito with three hundred men to
oppose the viceroy. He proceeded even ostensibly to take such measures
as were proper for executing this design; selecting such troops as were
to accompany himself to the south, and those who were to remain at
Quito; even distributing money to both divisions, and set off on his
march for the south after a general muster and review of his army.
Gonzalo contrived that intelligence of these proceedings should be
conveyed to the viceroy, by means of a spy in the employment of that
officer, who had betrayed his trust, and had even communicated to
Gonzalo the cypher which he used in corresponding with his employer.
Gonzalo made this person send intelligence to the viceroy of these
pretended motions; and Puelles wrote likewise to some friends in
Popayan, as if privately to inform them that he was left in the command
at Quito with three hundred men, with which he believed himself able to
resist all the force the viceroy might be able to bring against him; and
these letters were sent purposely in such a manner that they might fall
into the hands of the viceroy. Gonzalo likewise took care to spread
these reports among the Indians who were present at the review, and who,
having seen Gonzalo set off on his march to the south, were perfectly
acquainted with the number of troops which accompanied him on the march,
and of those which remained under Puelles at Quito. To give the greater
appearance of truth to these reports, Gonzalo actually set out on his
march; but halted at two or three days journey from Quito, under
pretence of falling sick.

On receiving intelligence of these circumstances, which he implicitly
believed, the viceroy determined to march from Popayan to Quito,
satisfied that he should be easily able to overpower the small force
left there under Puelles, who had no means of being reinforced. He
accordingly