given him no exalted notion of the enemy's prowess, and he was ready
to engage them single-handed. "I want my brigade," he said, "to feel
that it can itself whip Patterson's whole army, and I believe we can
do it." But Johnston's self-control was admirable. He was ready to
receive attack, believing that, in his selected position, he could
repulse superior numbers. But he was deaf to all who clamoured for an
offensive movement, to the murmurs of the men, and to the
remonstrances of the officers. The stone houses of Martinsburg and
its walled inclosures were proof against assault, and promised at
most a bloody victory. His stock of ammunition was scanty in the
extreme; the infantry had but fourteen cartridges apiece; and
although his patience was construed by his troops as a want of
enterprise, he had in truth displayed great daring in offering battle
south of Martinsburg.

The Federal army at Washington, commanded by General McDowell,
amounted to 50,000 men; a portion of this force was already south of
the Potomac, and Beauregard's 20,000 Confederates, at Manassas
Junction, were seriously threatened. In West Virginia the enemy had
advanced, moving, fortunately, in the direction of Staunton, at the
southern end of the Valley, and not on Winchester.

July 11.

On July 11, this force of 20,000 men defeated a Confederate
detachment at Rich Mountain, not far from Jackson's birthplace; and
although it was still in the heart of the Alleghanies, a few marches,
which there were practically no troops to oppose, would give it the
control of the Upper Valley.

Thus menaced by three columns of invasion, numbering together over
80,000 men, the chances of the Confederates, who mustered no more
than 32,000 all told, looked small indeed. But the three Federal
columns were widely separated, and it was possible, by means of the
Manassas Gap Railway, for Johnston and Beauregard to unite with
greater rapidity than their opponents.

President Davis, acting on the advice of General Lee, had therefore
determined to concentrate the whole available force at Manassas
Junction, and to meet at that point the column advancing from
Washington.* (* O.R. volume 2 page 515.) The difficulty was for the
Army of the Shenandoah to give Patterson the slip. This could easily
have been done while that officer stood fast at Martinsburg; but, in
Lee's opinion, if the enemy found that the whole force of the
Confederacy was concentrating at Manassas Juncti