es, not even excepting Lee, he compares
more than favourably. Most obedient of subordinates as he was, his
strategical views were not always in accordance with those of his
Commander-in-Chief. If Jackson had been in charge of the operations,
the disastrous battle of Malvern Hill would never have been fought;
Pope would have been cut off from the Rappahannock; McClellan would
have found the whole Confederate army arrayed against him at South
Mountain, or would have been attacked near Frederick; and Burnside
would have been encountered on the North Anna, where defeat would
probably have proved his ruin. It is difficult to compare him with
Lee. A true estimate of Lee's genius is impossible, for it can never
be known to what extent his designs were thwarted by the Confederate
Government. Lee served Mr. Davis; Jackson served Lee, wisest and most
helpful of masters. It would seem, however, that Jackson in one
respect was Lee's superior. His courage, physical and moral, was not
more brilliant or more steadfast; his tactical skill no greater; but
he was made of sterner stuff. His self-confidence was supreme. He
never doubted his ability, with God's help, to carry out any task his
judgment approved. Lee, on the other hand, was oppressed by a
consciousness of his own shortcomings. Jackson never held but one
council of war. Lee seldom made an important movement without
consulting his corps commanders. Jackson kept his subordinates in
their place, exacting from his generals the same implicit obedience
he exacted from his corporals. Lee lost the battle of Gettysburg
because he allowed his second in command to argue instead of
marching. Nor was that political courage, which Nelson declared is as
necessary for a commander as military courage, a component part of
Lee's character.* (* Lord Wolseley, Macmillan's Magazine, March,
1887.) On assuming command of the Army of Northern Virginia, in spite
of Mr. Davis' protestations, he resigned the control of the whole
forces of the Confederacy, and he submitted without complaint to
interference. Jackson's action when Loring's regiments were ordered
back by the Secretary of War is sufficient proof that he would have
brooked no meddling with his designs when once they had received the
sanction of the Cabinet. At the same time, it must remain
undetermined whether Jackson was equal to the vast responsibilities
which Lee bore with such steadfast courage; whether he could have
administered a great a