y powerful nation on conditions equal and
honorable to both parties. The events of that war are too recent and
too deeply impressed on the memory of all to require a development from
me. Our commerce had been in a great measure driven from the sea; our
Atlantic and inland frontiers were invaded in almost every part; the
waste of life along our coast and on some parts of our inland frontiers,
to the defense of which our gallant and patriotic citizens were called,
was immense, in addition to which not less than $120,000,000 were added
at its end to the public debt.
As soon as the war had terminated, the nation, admonished by its
events, resolved to place itself in a situation which should be better
calculated to prevent the recurrence of a like evil, and, in case it
should recur, to mitigate its calamities. With this view, after reducing
our land force to the basis of a peace establishment, which has been
further modified since, provision was made for the construction of
fortifications at proper points through the whole extent of our coast
and such an augmentation of our naval force as should be well adapted
to both purposes. The laws making this provision were passed in 1815
and 1816, and it has been since the constant effort of the Executive
to carry them into effect.
The advantage of these fortifications and of an augmented naval
force in the extent contemplated, in a point of economy, has been
fully illustrated by a report of the Board of Engineers and Naval
Commissioners lately communicated to Congress, by which it appears that
in an invasion by 20,000 men, with a correspondent naval force, in a
campaign of six months only, the whole expense of the construction of
the works would be defrayed by the difference in the sum necessary to
maintain the force which would be adequate to our defense with the aid
of those works and that which would be incurred without them. The reason
of this difference is obvious. If fortifications are judiciously placed
on our great inlets, as distant from our cities as circumstances will
permit, they will form the only points of attack, and the enemy will
be detained there by a small regular force a sufficient time to enable
our militia to collect and repair to that on which the attack is made.
A force adequate to the enemy, collected at that single point, with
suitable preparation for such others as might be menaced, is all that
would be requisite. But if there were no fortifications, th
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