plot to overthrow him in April 1965, Zhivkov took
steps to secure his position and to prevent future conspiracies. Because
the threat to his regime had come mainly from the army, Zhivkov and his
minister of defense often spoke to assemblies of military officers to
explain party policies and to assuage dissident feelings within military
ranks. In addition, state security functions were realigned in an
attempt to tighten the system in order that such conspiracies would not
be able to germinate in the future. The Ministry of the Interior lost
its responsibility for security to the newly created Committee of State
Security, which was under the direct supervision of Zhivkov in his
position as premier. Later, in 1968, the Committee of State Security and
the Ministry of the Interior were again merged under the latter's title.

After the abortive plot against him, Zhivkov offered some reforms to
placate disgruntled elements and to avoid a repetition of the incident.
Although the principal plotters were imprisoned, Zhivkov's reaction to
the conspiracy was one of general appeasement. This policy of
appeasement was shown by the fact that no general purges took place and
that people who could have been suspected of dissident activity were
allowed to remain in positions of authority in the party and in the
government rather than being summarily swept aside. The programs of
liberal reform that had been implemented before, but interrupted by, the
1965 plot were resumed, and Bulgaria seemed to be reaching for a
national destiny rather than accepting the role of a Soviet puppet. The
reforms affected all fields--political, economic, and cultural--and for
a time it seemed that the abortive coup d'etat had given new impetus to
Bulgarian national interests.

The promise of reform appeared to be the focal point around which the
Ninth Party Congress was convened in 1966, and at the congress party
leaders underscored the need for the widest participation in the
democratic process. Reforms, however, fell victim to the conservatism of
older party leaders, and Zhivkov did not have the personal strength or
magnetism to push forward his program. The ninth congress ended with the
reelection of the essentially reactionary Politburo and a reaffirmation
of the status quo. The bright hopes for economic, political, and social
progress that had been evident in late 1965 and early 1966 collapsed in
a return of rigid ideological dogma and a firm reliance on