,000,000
tons. This leaves about 90,000,000 tons for Germany's domestic use, as
compared with a pre-war domestic use of 139,000,000 tons. Even then,
these calculations make no allowance for coal to be used in export trade
to neutrals or other countries, some part of which seems vital to
Germany's trade. They make no allowance for the deterioration of plant
and machinery in the mines, which will delay resumption of coal
production. They make no allowance for the diminution in working hours
and the lack of transportation. In short, unless there is a miraculous
recovery and development of Germany's coal industry, impossible
conditions have been imposed. Some recognition of this fact appears in
the great powers to adjust terms which have been vested in the
Reparations Committee. Successive revisions of requirements by the
Reparations Committee have already reduced the direct contributions of
coal from Germany nearly fifty per cent. The entire European coal
situation is in a state of chaos. It was found necessary in 1918 to
appoint a Coal Commission under international control, to attempt to
allocate and distribute supplies. It seems inevitable that the physical
facts of the situation will prevail, and that the control of the Allies
will resolve itself into efforts to distribute and coordinate supplies
so as to keep the European machinery going, more or less regardless of
the terms of the Peace Treaty.

One of the important outcomes of this situation has been the recent
rapid development of German lignite production, based on newly
worked-out methods of treatment and utilization.

By taking over Alsace-Lorraine, France acquires about 70 per cent of the
iron ore reserves and annual production of Germany. This production was
in minor part smelted locally,--the larger part moving down the Rhine to
the vicinity of the Ruhr coal fields, and Ruhr coal coming back for the
smelting in Lorraine. This great channel of balanced exchange of
commodities has been determined by nature, and is not likely to be
permanently affected by political changes. For the time being, however,
the drawing of a political boundary across this trade route hinders the
full resumption of the trade. Self-interest will require both Germany
and France to keep these routes open. France requires German coal to
supply the local smelters near the iron fields, and German markets for
the excess production of iron ore. On the other hand, Germany's great
smelting dis