of various corps inland to cut off
Medina, the last place of importance held by the Turks after the summer
of 1916. Yet the town held out until long after the armistice, and its
surrender had eventually to be brought about by putting pressure on the
Turkish Government at Stamboul. On the other hand, the two great
provinces which impinge upon the Hejaz, namely, Nejd and Yamen, have
given ample proof that they can hammer the Turks without outside
assistance. The Nejdis not only cleared their own country of Ottoman
rule, but drove the Turks out of Hasa a year or two before the War,
while the Yamenis have more than once hurled the Turks back on to the
coast, and the rebels of northern Yamen successfully withstood a Hejazi
and Turkish column from the north and another Turkish column from the
south. The inference is that if the limits of Hejazi rule are to be much
extended there had better be a clear understanding with their neighbours
and also some definite idea of the extent to which we are likely to be
involved in support of our _protege_.

I know that many otherwise intelligent people have been hypnotised by
the prophecy in "The White Prophet":

"The time is near when the long drama that has been played
between Arabs and Turks will end in the establishment of a vast
Arabic empire, extending from the Tigris and the Euphrates
valley to the Mediterranean and from the Indian Ocean to
Jerusalem, with Cairo as its Capital, the Khedive as its
Caliph, and England as its lord and protector."

While refraining from obvious and belated criticism of a prophecy which
the march of events has trodden out of shape, and which could never have
been intended as a serious contribution to our knowledge of Arabs and
their politics, we must admit that the basic idea of centralising
Arabian authority has taken strong hold of avowed statecraft in England.
It would, of course, simplify our relations with Arabia and the
collateral regions of Mesopotamia and Syria if such authority could
establish itself and be accepted by the other Arabian provinces to the
extent of enforcing its enactments as regards their foreign affairs,
_i.e._, relations with subjects (national or protected) of European
States.

If such authority could be maintained without assistance from us other
than a subsidy and the occasional supply, to responsible parties, of
arms and ammunition, it would satisfy all reasonable requirements, but
if we had to