e service of a
citation upon him in case of appeal is sufficient. United States _v._
Curry, 6 Howard, U. S. Rep. 106.

[11] A counsel, attorney, or solicitor, will in no case be permitted,
even if he should be willing to do so, to divulge any matter which has
been communicated to him in professional confidence. This is not his
privilege, but the privilege of the client, and none but the client can
waive it. Jenkinson _v._ The State, 5 Blackford, 465; Benjamin _v._
Coventry, 19 Wendell, 353; Parker _v._ Carter, 4 Munf. 273; Wilson _v._
Troup, 7 Johns. Ch. Rep. 25; Crosby _v._ Berger, 11 Paige, 377; Bank of
Utica _v._ Mersereau, 3 Barbour Ch. Rep. 528; Aiken _v._ Kilburne, 27
Maine, 252; Crisler _v._ Garland, 11 Smedes & Marshall, 136; Chew _v._
The Farmers' Bank of Maryland, 2 Maryland Ch. Decis. 231. It will be
found in some of these cases that though the counsel declined to be
engaged for the client, yet the facts communicated were held
confidential; the only exception recognized being where a purpose to
perpetrate _in futuro_ a felony or an action _malum in se_ was
disclosed. Bank of Utica _v._ Mersereau, 3 Barbour Ch. Rep. 377. In
Moore _v._ Bray, 10 Barr, 519, it was held that communications of the
object, for which an assignment of a mortgage was made, to a counsel
concerned for the assignee, were privileged; although no question then
arose as to the object of the assignment, and the counsel considered the
communication in the light of a casual conversation. "The circle of
protection," said Bell, J., "is not so narrow as to exclude
communications a professional person may deem unimportant to the
controversy, or the briefest and lightest talk the client may choose to
indulge with his legal adviser, provided he regards him as such at the
moment. To found a distinction on such a ground would be to measure the
safety of the confiding party by the extent of his intelligence and
knowledge, and to expose to betrayal those very anxieties, which prompt
those in difficulty, to seek the ear of him in whom they trust in season
and out of season."

[12] Burnet's Life of Hale, 1 Hale's Works, 59, 60. "He began," says
Lord Campbell, "with the specious but impracticable rule of never
pleading except on the right side, which would make the counsel to
decide without knowing either facts or law, and would put an end to the
administration of justice." 1 Lord Campbell's Lives of the Chief
Justices, 412. There is the following curious