ppeal to you I have had to appeal to this, as yet
your only interest. The moral value of your action lies wholly in its
conduciveness to this interest, because it is controlled wholly by it.
You are as yet only a complex acting consistently in such wise as to
continue an eating of apples. This formula is entirely sufficient as a
summary of your conduct, even after you have learned to respect my
property. And therein lies {50} its _merely_ prudential character. In
prudence thus strictly and abstractly regarded, there is no preference,
no subordination of motives. Action is controlled by an exclusive and
insistent desire, which limits itself only with a view to effectiveness.

III

It would appear, then, that if I am to justify those types of action
which are regarded as more completely moral, _I must persuade you to
adopt interests that at any given instant do not move you_. I must
persuade you to forego your present inclination for the sake of
another; to judge between interests, and prefer that which on grounds
that you cannot reasonably deny is the more valid. In other words, I
must define a logical transition from prudence to _preference_, or
_moral purpose_.

Let us suppose that, in spite of your liking, apples do not "agree
with" you. It is, for example, pertinent to remark that if you eat the
apple to-day you cannot go to the play to-morrow. Our parley proceeds
as follows:

"Just now I am eating apples. Sufficient unto the day is the evil
thereof."

"But you acknowledge your fondness for the theatre."

"Yes, but that doesn't interest me now."

"Nevertheless you recognize the interest in {51} play-going as a real
one, dormant to-day, temporarily eclipsed by another interest, but
certain to revive to-morrow?"

"I do."

"And you admit that, apart from the chance of your death in the
meantime, a chance so small as to be negligible, an interest to-morrow
is as real as an interest to-day?"

"Yes."

"Now, recognizing these two interests, and keeping them firmly in view,
observe the consequences of your action if you persist in eating the
apple, and pronounce judgment upon it."

"It would seem to be both good and bad; good in its conduciveness to
the satisfaction of my present appetite, bad in its preventing my
enjoyment of the play."

In your last reply you have fairly stated the problem. You are not
permitted to escape the dilemma by simply neglecting the facts, for
this would be contrary