closer quarters, and hence the weapons of the time were as
effective, or more so, than the present ones. That this increased
distance between the combatants will always counterbalance the increased
deadliness of the weapons in the future is more than probable, since the
range of effectiveness has been increased both in rifle and in artillery
fire. In the present campaign the effect of the latter was very
noticeable, since the Boers were, as a rule, quickly displaced by shell
fire, unless they were in especially favourable positions, and this
although no great number of men was hit by the projectiles. Under these
circumstances, except on some occasions, neither side derived all the
advantage from the increased shooting powers of their rifles which might
have been expected. To a lesser degree this will probably always be the
case in the future.

In connection with these remarks, however, I would point to column 4 of
Table III., as showing how difficult it is to draw definite deductions
from any particular set of numbers alone. This column shows that in the
Russo-Turkish War of 1877 all the percentages were practically doubled
or more, and in the case of the number of men killed on the field of
battle, the number was nearly five times as great as either in the
Crimea or the present campaign. The explanation here depends on the race
of men and their tenacity in resistance alone. In the case of either
nation death in battle is little feared, and slight inclination to avoid
it exists. When the theory of war held by the Boer--_i.e._ going out to
shoot an enemy without incurring risk of being yourself shot--is borne
in mind, the special circumstances attending the present campaign are
sufficiently obvious to need little further remark. A future campaign in
which the combatants are as equally well armed, but each side stands to
the last, will probably give very different results.

It is unfortunate that no details can be given as to the influence of
range in altering the relative numbers of killed to wounded. It may be
stated, however, that in no instance did the percentage of killed to
wounded reach 25 per cent. At the battle of Magersfontein it amounted to
19.26 per cent., at Colenso to 17.97 per cent., and at both these
engagements there is little doubt that a considerable number of the men
were hit within a distance of 1,000 yards. When the distances were very
short the injuries were frequently multiple; and this character w