the
supply remaining the same, the price advances; if both supply and demand
are undiminished, the price is stationary, and the price is influenced
exactly in proportion to the degree of disturbance to the demand or
supply. It is, therefore, a great error to suppose that an existing or
new duty necessarily becomes a component element to its exact amount of
price. If the proportions of demand and supply are varied by the duty,
either in augmenting the supply or diminishing the demand, or vice
versa, the price is affected to the extent of that variation. But
the duty never becomes an integral part of the price, except in the
instances where the demand and the supply remain after the duty is
imposed precisely what they were before, or the demand is increased, and
the supply remains stationary.

Competition, therefore, wherever existing, whether at home or abroad,
is the parent cause of cheapness. If a high duty excites production at
home, and the quantity of the domestic article exceeds the amount which
had been previously imported, the price will fall. * * *

But it is argued that if, by the skill, experience, and perfection which
we have acquired in certain branches of manufacture, they can be made as
cheap as similar articles abroad, and enter fairly into competition with
them, why not repeal the duties as to those articles? And why should we?
Assuming the truth of the supposition, the foreign article would not be
introduced in the regular course of trade, but would remain excluded
by the possession of the home market, which the domestic article had
obtained. The repeal, therefore, would have no legitimate effect. But
might not the foreign article be imported in vast quantities, to glut
our markets, break down our establishments, and ultimately to enable the
foreigner to monopolize the supply of our consumption? America is the
greatest foreign market for European manufactures. It is that to which
European attention is constantly directed. If a great house becomes
bankrupt there, its storehouses are emptied, and the goods are shipped
to America, where, in consequence of our auctions, and our custom-house
credits, the greatest facilities are afforded in the sale of them.
Combinations among manufacturers might take place, or even the
operations of foreign governments might be directed to the destruction
of our establishments. A repeal, therefore, of one protecting duty,
from some one or all of these causes, would be foll