FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203   204   205   206   207   208   209   210  
211   212   213   214   215   216   217   218   219   220   221   222   223   224   225   226   227   228   229   230   231   232   233   234   235   >>   >|  
mstances were then such that the President no longer possessed the power to compel England to observe international law. England would only give way before the menace of war. In view, however, of the state of natural feeling in the United States, and the development of trade relations between America and the Entente, war with England was out of the question. On the other hand, Mr. Wilson possessed the power to bring about peace, because on this question he could rely on the support of the majority of the American nation. When the time was ripe, the President would take the desired steps, but a neutral act of this nature would be cried down by the very active Entente party in the United States as pro-German, and could only be carried through if the national feeling towards Germany took a more friendly turn. It was, therefore, necessary that there should be a period of lull, during which Germany should possibly not be discussed at all. The approaching hot season and the usual exodus of political personages from Washington to the country would offer a favorable opportunity to let all negotiations rest, especially as, after the settlement of the _Sussex_ question, no new incidents were to be expected. Colonel House's remarks accurately reflected the actual position in the United States at the time. I could not but express my agreement, and felt no doubt that the American mediation would begin in the late summer. After our giving way on the submarine question in order to avoid a break with the United States, I regarded it as certain that we would not directly bring about the rupture which had just been averted with such difficulty by reopening the unrestricted submarine campaign, for in view of the American ultimatum of the 18th April, 1916, there was no alternative. I should like to take this opportunity of making clear that I always regarded American mediation as the only possible way out of the war. I had no faith in the submarine campaign as likely to save the situation, because the entry of the United States into the war would more than outweigh all the advantages that the submarines could bring us. On the other hand I was convinced that If the American Government established a peace conference, this would be sure to lead to peace itself. It could not be imagined that, in view of the nations' need of peace, such a conference could break up without having reached any result. Moreover, after the meeting of a conference,
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203   204   205   206   207   208   209   210  
211   212   213   214   215   216   217   218   219   220   221   222   223   224   225   226   227   228   229   230   231   232   233   234   235   >>   >|  



Top keywords:
States
 

United

 

American

 

question

 

England

 

conference

 

submarine

 
President
 

Germany

 
campaign

regarded

 

possessed

 

opportunity

 

Entente

 

mediation

 
feeling
 

directly

 
position
 

mstances

 

rupture


actual

 
accurately
 

difficulty

 

remarks

 

averted

 

reflected

 

express

 
agreement
 

giving

 

summer


established
 

Government

 
submarines
 

convinced

 

imagined

 

nations

 

result

 

Moreover

 

meeting

 

reached


advantages

 

outweigh

 

alternative

 
making
 
unrestricted
 

ultimatum

 
situation
 

reopening

 

desired

 

neutral