" etc. Is
this really so?

So far as the "duties of the State" are concerned, Kropotkine is quite
right; it would be too absurd if the Anarchists invited the State to
disappear in the name of its own "duties." But as to "natural rights" he
is altogether mistaken. A few quotations will suffice to prove this.

Already in the _Bulletin de la Federation Jurasienne_ (No. 3, 1877), we
find the following very significant declaration: "The sovereignty of the
people can only exist through the most complete autonomy of individuals
and of groups." This "most complete autonomy," is it not also a
"metaphysical conception?"

The _Bulletin de la Federation Jurasienne_ was an organ of Collectivist
Anarchism. At bottom there is no difference between "Collectivist" and
"Communist" Anarchism. And yet, since it might be that we are making the
Communists responsible for the Collectivists, let us glance at the
"Communist" publications, not only according to the spirit but the
letter. In the autumn of 1892 a few "companions" appeared before the
Assize Court of Versailles in consequence of a theft of dynamite at
Soisy-sous-Etiolles. Among others there was one G. Etievant, who drew up
a declaration of Anarchist-Communist principles. The tribunal would not
allow him to read it, whereupon the official organ of the Anarchists,
_La Revolte_, undertook to publish this declaration, having taken great
pains to secure an absolutely correct copy of the original. The
"Declaration of G. Etievant" made a sensation in the Anarchist world,
and even "cultured" men like Octave Mirbeau quote it with respect along
with the works of the "theorists," Bakounine, Kropotkine, the
"unequalled Proudhon," and the "aristocratic Spencer!" Now this is the
line of Etievant's reasoning:

No idea is innate in us; each idea is born of infinitely diverse and
multiple sensations, which we receive by means of our organs. Every act
of the individual is the result of one or several ideas. The man is not
therefore responsible. In order that responsibility should exist, will
would have to determine the sensations, just as these determine the
idea, and the idea, the act. But as it is, on the contrary, the
sensations which determine the will, all judgment becomes impossible,
every reward, every punishment unjust, however great the good or the
evil done may be. "Thus one cannot judge men and acts unless one has a
sufficient criterion. Now no such criterion exists. At any rate it is