logy what the analytical jurists accomplished
in law and jurisprudence, and it will then soon become necessary to do
for anthropology what Sir Henry Maine did for comparative
jurisprudence, namely, demonstrate that the analytical method does not
take us back to human origins, but to highly developed systems of
society. Law, in the hands of the analytical jurists, is merely one
part of the machinery of modern government. Social beginnings in the
hands of conjectural anthropologists are merely abstractions with the
whole history of man put on one side. Mr. Lang in leading the way
towards the analytical method in anthropology has avoided many of its
pitfalls, but his disciples are not so successful. Thus, when Mr.
Thomas declares that "custom which has among them [primitive peoples]
far more power than law among us, determines whether a man is of kin
to his mother and her relatives alone, or to his father and father's
relatives, or whether both sets of relatives are alike of kin to
them,"[309] he is neglecting the whole significance and range of
custom. His statement is true analytically, but it is not true
anthropologically until we have ascertained what this custom to which
he refers really is, whence it is derived, how it has obtained its
force, what is its range of action, how it operates in differentiating
among the various groups of mankind--in a word, what is the human
history associated with this custom.

We must, however, at certain points in anthropological inquiry have
recourse to the conjectural method. Its value lies in the fact that it
states, and states clearly, the issue which is before us, and it is
always possible to take up the conjectural position and endeavour to
ascertain whether the neglected facts of human history which it
expresses can be recovered. Its danger lies in the neglect of certain
anthropological principles which can only be noted from definite
examples, and the significance of which can only be discovered by the
handling of definite examples. I will refer to one or two of the
principles which I have in mind. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish
between what is a practice and what is a rule. A practice precedes a
rule. A practice incidental to one stage of society must not be
confused with a rule, similar to the practice, obtaining in a
different stage of society. Again, it must be borne in mind that
identity of practice is no certain evidence of parallel stages of
culture, and already i