ack for that alone.[130] In telling the
story, Pasco used to say it was no wonder that the common sailors
idolized Nelson, since he was always thinking about them, and won
their hearts by showing his own.

In addition to the combined fleets in Cadiz, which numbered thirty-six
of the line, besides frigates, the enemy had a half-dozen of the line
in Cartagena, which showed signs of moving, and whose junction must be
prevented, if possible. Partly for this reason, partly because it was
necessary to renew the water of the ships, Nelson sent a detachment of
six of the line to Gibraltar and Tetuan, immediately after he took
charge. To the junior admiral who commanded it, and who lamented that
they might lose their share in the expected battle, he replied: "I
have no other means of keeping my fleet complete in provisions and
water. The enemy _will_ come out, and we shall fight them; but there
will be time for you to get back first." They did not, however, return
as thus expected, a misadventure which was chiefly due to their having
to guard a convoy past Cartagena,--a potent illustration of the
influence exerted by a powerful squadron, judiciously placed on the
flank of an important trade route, or line of communication; but even
had they rejoined, six others were told off to leave at once in turn.
Nelson did not dare to take the fleet in mass to Tetuan, as he used to
Madalena; for he could never be sure of getting out of the Straits
when he wished, or when the enemy moved. Thus his fleet was reduced,
by both administrative and strategic exigencies, to twenty-three
ships-of-the-line. Fortunately, four more joined before the battle,
raising the numbers actually engaged to twenty-seven. It will be
recognized that Calder's ninety-gun ship was no small loss.

Such were the general dispositions in which the sailing of the enemy
was awaited. A main body of eighteen to twenty, fifty miles west of
Cadiz, a frigate squadron close in to the harbor, and two groups of
ships-of-the-line extended between these extremes. With a westerly
wind, approach to the port would be easy for all; with an easterly,
Nelson wrote to Blackwood, he would habitually beat up for Cadiz,
never going north of the port. His whereabouts in case of thick
weather was thus always known. He notified Collingwood and his other
subordinates, that if the enemy came out, he should stand for Cape
Spartel, the African outpost of the Straits, to bar the entrance of
the alli