one and two thousand annually, (See
Judge Tucker's "Dissertation on Slavery," p. 73;) when the public
sentiment of Virginia had undergone, so mighty a revolution that the
idea of the continuance of slavery as a permanent system could not be
tolerated, though she then contained about half the slaves in the Union.
Was this the time to stipulate for the _perpetuity_ of slavery under the
exclusive legislation of Congress? and that too when at the _same_
session _every one_ of her delegation voted for the abolition of slavery
in the North West Territory; a territory which she herself had ceded to
the Union, and surrendered along with it her jurisdiction over her
citizens, inhabitants of that territory, who held slaves there--and
whose slaves were emancipated by that act of Congress, in which all her
delegation with one accord participated?

Now in view of the universal belief then prevalent, that slavery in this
country was doomed to short life, and especially that in Maryland and
Virginia it would be _speedily_ abolished--must we adopt the monstrous
conclusion that those states _designed_ to bind Congress _never_ to
terminate it?--that it was the _intent_ of the Ancient Dominion thus to
_bind_ the United States by an "implied faith," and that when the
national government _accepted_ the cession, she did solemnly thus plight
her troth, and that Virginia did then so _understand_ it? Verily,
honorable senators must suppose themselves deputed to do our _thinking_
for us as well as our legislation, or rather, that they are themselves
absolved from such drudgery by virtue of their office!

Another absurdity of this "implied faith" dogma is, that where there was
no power to exact an _express_ pledge, there was none to demand an
_implied_ one, and where there was no power to give the one, there was
none to give the other. We have shown already that Congress could not
have accepted the cession with such a condition. To have signed away a
part of its constitutional grant of power would have been a _breach_ of
the Constitution. The Congress which accepted the cession was competent
to pass a resolution pledging itself not to _use all_ the power over the
District committed to it by the Constitution. But here its power ended.
Its resolution could only bind _itself_. It had no authority to bind a
subsequent Congress. Could the members of one Congress say to those of
another, because we do not choose to exercise all the authority vested
i