tive branch the need for
integrating departmental reports to national policymakers. Detailed
coordinated information was needed not only on such major powers as
Germany and Japan, but also on places of little previous interest. In
the Pacific Theater, for example, the Navy and Marines had to launch
amphibious operations against many islands about which information was
unconfirmed or nonexistent. Intelligence authorities resolved that the
United States should never again be caught unprepared.

In 1943, Gen. George B. Strong (G-2), Adm. H. C. Train (Office of
Naval Intelligence-ONI), and Gen. William J. Donovan (Director of the
Office of Strategic Services-OSS) decided that a joint effort should
be initiated. A steering committee was appointed on 27 April 1943 that
recommended the formation of a Joint Intelligence Study Publishing
Board to assemble, edit, coordinate, and publish the Joint Army Navy
Intelligence Studies (JANIS). JANIS was the first interdepartmental
basic intelligence program to fulfill the needs of the US Government
for an authoritative and coordinated appraisal of strategic basic
intelligence. Between April 1943 and July 1947, the board published 34
JANIS studies. JANIS performed well in the war effort, and numerous
letters of commendation were received, including a statement from Adm.
Forrest Sherman, Chief of Staff, Pacific Ocean Areas, which said,
"JANIS has become the indispensable reference work for the shore-based
planners."

The need for more comprehensive basic intelligence in the postwar
world was well expressed in 1946 by George S. Pettee, a noted author
on national security. He wrote in The Future of American Secret
Intelligence (Infantry Journal Press, 1946, page 46) that world
leadership in peace requires even more elaborate intelligence than
war. "The conduct of peace involves all countries, all human
activities--not just the enemy and his war production."

The Central Intelligence Agency was established on 26 July 1947 and
officially began operating on 18 September 1947. Effective 1 October
1947, the Director of Central Intelligence assumed operational
responsibility for JANIS. On 13 January 1948, the National Security
Council issued Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 3, which authorized
the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) program as a peacetime
replacement for the wartime JANIS program. Before adequate NIS country
sections could be produced, government agencies had to develop more