in death!

II.--CALVINISM IS NOT TO BE RECONCILED WITH THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF MAN.

Whatever extent we assign to the corruption of human nature, by
which its moral powers have been impaired, or the soul disqualified
for the due and proper use of those powers, it is plain that men are
still capable of acting, and of being treated as the subjects of
moral government. Calvinistic writers do themselves admit the
turpitude of sin and the loveliness of virtue--that vice entails
suffering, and that happiness is the consequence of a religious
conformity to the will of God. That is, setting aside all special
refinements by which they attempt to disprove that the present state
of man is probationary, they confess that _practically_ mankind are
treated as accountable beings whose guilt is punished and their
goodness rewarded. This broad and unquestionable fact defies
controversy. Although we may not be able to give a definition of
_freedom_ which may satisfy the philosopher, and although we may
concede to the opposers of the freedom of the will, that virtue and
vice--moral good and moral evil--are to be predicated, not of the
cause, whether it be freedom or fate, from whence our volitions
spring, but of the good or evil nature of the volitions themselves
--in whatever way these questions are decided, or, if we leave them
undecided, as being beyond the present grasp of the human intellect,
men are unquestionably subjected by the Deity to the laws of a moral
economy. They are, sooner or later, rendered happy in exact
proportion to their conformity to the commands of God, and miserable
if they remain rebellious.

And all we contend for is, that such a state of things can never be
explained on the supposition of absolute predestination or
inevitable necessity, founded on the irreversible decrees of Heaven.
The reason appears on a moment's consideration. The good or evil
nature of the volition belongs, on this hypothesis, not to the
created being, who is a passive instrument, without actual power
--but to the Creator, who is the only real agent, as well as the
efficient cause. The instrument by which He accomplishes his
purposes may be good or evil, the volitions of that instrument may
be characterised by whatever qualities you please, still, a mere
instrument is not an object of moral approbation or blame; no
responsibility attaches to it, and the condition on which it acts is
perfectly incongruous with all the ideas we