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of the cow that bore it; fruit to the owner of the
tree or vine on which it grew; and so on. But the principle of _natural
law_, which makes a calf belong to the owner of the cow, does not make
the child of a slave belong to the owner of the slave--and why? Simply
because both cow and calf are _naturally_ subjects of property; while
neither men nor children are _naturally_ subjects of property. The law
of nature gives no aid to any thing inconsistent with itself. It
therefore gives no aid to the transmission of property in man--while it
does give aid to the transmission of property in other animals and in
things.
Brute animals and things being _naturally_ subjects of property, there
are obvious reasons why the natural increase should belong to the owner
of the original stock. But men, not being _naturally_ subjects of
property, the law of nature will not transmit any right of property
acquired in violation of her own authority. The law of nature denies all
rights not derived from herself. Of course she cannot perpetuate or
transmit such rights--if rights they can be called.
One important reason why a calf belongs to the owner of the cow that
bore it, is, _that there is no principle of natural law that can be
opposed to that ownership_. For the calf is naturally a subject of
property, and if it were not given to the owner of the cow, it would be
lawful for any other person to assume the ownership. No wrong would be
done to the animal by so doing. But as man is not naturally a subject of
property, and as each separate individual is, on principles of natural
law, entitled to the control of his own person, it is as much a wrong,
and as much a violation of natural law, to make a slave of the child of
a slave, as to make a slave of any other person. The natural rights of
the child to the control of his own person, rise up, from the moment of
his birth, in opposition to the transmission to him of any ownership,
which, in violation of natural law, has been asserted to the parent.
Natural law may be overborne by arbitrary institutions; but she will
never aid, or perpetuate them. For her to do so, would be to resist, and
even deny her own authority. It would present the case of a principle
warring against and overcoming itself. Instead of this, she asserts her
own authority on the first opportunity. The moment the arbitrary law
expires by its own limitation, natural law resumes her reign. If,
therefore, the government decla
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