ings. The teleological now seems to him
itself a factor playing a part in the chain of causes, and thus making it
teleological. The key-word of all is to him the "entelechy" of Aristotle.

In his last work on "The Soul," Driesch follows the impossibilities of the
mechanical theories from the domain of vital processes into that of
behaviour and voluntary actions.

The Views of Albrecht and Schneider.

An outlook and interpretation which Driesch(102) maintained for a while,
but afterwards abandoned, has been developed in an original and peculiar
fashion by Eugen Albrecht, Prosector and Pathologist in Munich.(103) It is
the theory of different ways of looking at things. Albrecht indeed firmly
adheres to the chemical and physical interpretation of vital processes,
regards approximate completeness along these lines as the ideal of
science, and maintains their essential sufficiency. But he holds that the
mechanists have been mistaken and one-sided in that they have upheld this
interpretation and mode of considering things as the sole and the "true"
one. According to our subjective attitude to things and their changes,
they appear to us in quite different series of associations, each of which
forms a complete series in itself, running parallel to the others, but not
intruding to fill up gaps in them. Microscopic and macroscopic study of
things illustrate such separate and complete series. The classical example
for the whole theory is the psycho-physical parallelism. Psychical
phenomena are not "explained" when the correlated line of material changes
and the phenomena of the nervous system have been traced out. Similarly
with the series of "vital" phenomena, "vital" interpretation from the
point of view of the "living organism," runs parallel to, but distinct
from the chemical and physical analyses of vital processes. But each of
these parallel ways of regarding things is "true." For the current
separation of the "appearance" and "nature" of things is false, since it
assumes that only one of the possible ways of regarding things, _e.g._,
the mechanical-causal mode of interpretation is essential, and that all
the others deal only with associated appearance.

The idea that only one or two of these series can represent the "true
nature" of the phenomenon "can only be called cheap dogma." Each series is
complete in itself, and every successive phase follows directly and
without a break from the antecedent one, which alone